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INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN
DEVELOPMENTS IN FAMILY LAW 2013
Louise Crowley*
Rsumb
Ce chapitre fait une revue de certains r6cents d6veloppements en droit de la famille
dans le contexte du droit international et du droit de l'Union europ6enne. Les
themes abord6s incluent l'enkvement international (en particulier la d6fense de
risque grave de danger en cas de retour de l'enfant, ainsi que l'usage de la
m6diation dans des cas d'application de la Convention de La Haye), I'influence de
'Rome III' et de 'Bruxelles II bis' sur le droit de la famille (particulirement la
reconnaissance et l'ex6cution des jugements en matiere de divorce, de s6paration et
d'obligation alimentaire), la reconnaissance de plus en plus 6tendue du caractare
ex6cutoire des ententes conjugales, ainsi que les changements, sur le plan
international, en matiere de mariage entre personnes de meme sexe. Finalement, il
sera fait 6tat de quelques r6cents d6veloppments dans la jurisprudence de la Cour
europ6enne des droits de l'homme.
I CHILD ABDUCTION LAW - BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD AND THE ART 13(B) DEFENCE
In the context of an international dispute concerning alleged child abduction,
the oft-unavoidable interaction of co-existing international agreements can give
rise to interpretive challenges for the courts. One such instance arose in the
2010 ruling of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) in Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland,' in respect of the interaction
between the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction ('the Hague
Convention'). In particular, the ruling of the court raised questions as to the
tests to be applied in respect of the protection of children and how to assess
what is in the best interests of the child in such a dispute. The decision by the
Grand Chamber to refuse to force the return of the child to his country of
origin certainly had the potential to impact significantly upon the principles
and objectives of the Hague Convention and represented a departure from the
underlying principle of the Hague Convention that disputes over children are
best resolved in the child's country of habitual residence. The disquiet arising
* Faculty of Law, University College Cork.
Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland [2010] ECHR 1053.
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from the position adopted by the Grand Chamber was fortunately addressed
head-on by the United Kingdom Supreme Court (UKSC) in Re E (Children), 2
which welcomed the opportunity to provide guidance to judges and
practitioners in the United Kingdom, given the inevitability of the need to
address the interrelationship of these two international instruments.
In an attempt to elevate the importance of the impact of an order to return the
child on the mother, and consequently upon the child, it was argued in support
of the position of the applicant mother in Neulinger that, whilst the preamble
to the Hague Convention states that 'the interests of children are of paramount
importance in matters relating to their custody' 3 this does not go as far as the
unequivocal statement of the UNCRC that the child's welfare is 'a primary
consideration'. However, this effort to distinguish the two instruments and
suggest a stronger protection of the interests and thus welfare of children under
the UNCRC was rejected by the Supreme Court in Re (Children) which noted
that whilst 'the best interests of the child are not expressly made a primary
consideration in Hague Convention proceedings, [this] does not mean that it is
not at the forefront of the whole exercise'.4 Although the articles of the Hague
Convention might not expressly identify the best interests of the child as a
governing principle, the preamble notes the universal desire on the part of all
signatories to protect children, and the communal view amongst signatories
that 'the interests of children are of paramount importance'.5
(a) Invoking the Art 13(b) defence to defeat an order for the
return of a child
Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention provides that the judicial or
administrative authority of the requested state is not bound to order the return
of the child if the person who opposes the return can establish that 'there is a
grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation'. The
scope of this defence and the correct test to be applied has received significant
attention in a number of recent high profile cases.
2 Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2012] 1 AC 144; [2011] Fam Law 919.
Article 3. UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November
1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol 1577, p 3, available at: www.unher.org/refworld/docid/
3ae6b38f0.html (accessed June 2013).
4 Above n 2 at para 14.
Ibid. Stressing that the aim of the 1980 Hague Convention is as much to deter people from
wrongfully abducting children as it is to serve the best interests of the children who have been
abducted, the UK Supreme Court added that the Convention also aims to serve the best
interests of the individual child. It quotes directly from the preamble to the Convention which
declares that the signatory states are: 'Firmly convinced that the interests of children are of
paramount importance in matters relating to custody [and are] . . . Desiring to protect children
internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention.' Certainly the
UKSC confidently asserts that nowhere in the Convention is it stated that this objective is to
serve the best interests of the adult person, or other person/body whose custody rights have
been infringed.
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Much concern arose following the 2010 ruling of the Grand Chamber in
Neulinger and the perceived lowering of the threshold for a successful Art 13(b)
defence. The case concerned the removal of an Israeli boy from Israel by his
mother, a Swiss national. Subsequent to their divorce in 2005, and following an
application by the father, the Tel Aviv Family Court had confirmed that the
child was habitually resident in Tel Aviv and that the parents had joint
guardianship. As a result it found that the child's removal from Israel without
the father's consent was wrongful within the meaning of Art 3 of the Hague
Convention. Following his request for the return of the child, the mother
invoked the Art 13(b) defence, claiming that to return the child to Israel would
expose him to physical and psychological harm or otherwise place him in an
intolerable situation. It was alleged on behalf of the applicants (mother and
son) that, by ordering the return of the child to Israel, the Swiss Federal Court
had breached their right to respect for their family life as guaranteed by Art 8
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Swiss Federal
Court (Cantonal Court) had ordered the return of the child given that there
was an absence of evidence that would objectively justify a refusal on the
mother's part to return to Israel, thereby preventing her from invoking the
Art 13(b) defence in respect of the alleged associated serious threats to the
well-being of the child. The Swiss Court, with reference to Art 13(b), asserted
that the defence is not even open to consideration 'unless the child's
intellectual, physical, moral or social development is under serious threat'. 6 A
Chamber of the ECtHR delivered its judgment in January 2009, declaring the
complaint under Art 8 admissible and by a majority of 4:3 found that there had
been no violation of Art 8. However, this ruling was overturned by the Grand
Chamber of the ECtHR on the basis that the order to return the child to Israel
constituted an infringement of the right to respect for the private and family
lives of the mother and child, as protected by Art 8 of the ECHR.
In terms of implementing the aims and objectives of the Hague Convention,
one of the main concerns arising from the Neulinger judgment was the
apparent shift away from the primacy of the expeditious return of the child to
his or her country of origin.7 Given the perceived weight to be attached to
Art 8 of the ECHR, the Grand Chamber asserted that a child's return 'cannot
be ordered automatically or mechanically when the Hague Convention is
applicable', notwithstanding the request from the domestic court. Rather, it
identified an obligation on the part of the domestic court, prior to ordering the
return of the child, to conduct 'an in-depth examination' to assess the best
interests of the child in each individual case, such best interests being
determined with reference to 'a variety of individual circumstances, in
particular his age and level of maturity, the presence or absence of his parents
6 With reference to and reliance upon Judgment 5P65/2002 of 11 April 2002.
Above n 1. In the course of the judgment of the Grand Chamber, at para 39, a communication
from the Israeli Central Authority was cited which had emphasised to its Swiss counterpart the
presumption under the Hague Convention that the child ought to be returned to his father,
reminding the Swiss Central Authority that it 'must be remembered that this is a Hague
Convention proceeding, and not a custody case'.
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and his environment and experiences'. 8 In carrying out this exercise, the Grand
Chamber emphasised the importance of ensuring that the decision-making
process of the domestic court was fair, which in the opinion of the Grand
Chamber necessitated the provision of an opportunity for those concerned 'to
present their case fully'.9 According to the Grand Chamber, this included the
requested court being satisfied that the domestic court had 'conducted an
in-depth examination of the entire family situation and of a whole series of
factors, in particular of a factual, emotional, psychological, material and
medical nature, and made a balanced and reasonable assessment of the
respective interests of each person',10 in order to determine if the return of the
child to his country of origin would be the best solution in the circumstances.
This obvious departure from the priority of ensuring the speedy return of the
child to the country of origin, regarded as the court best placed to determine
the substantive dispute, would place a very heavy burden on the domestic court
to conduct a thorough investigation at a very preliminary application stage and
appeared to ignore the summary nature of Hague proceedings.
In order to properly assess this perceived shift in approach, it is important to
contextualise the case, as it is perhaps distinguishable on its own facts, given
that the boy was 2 when leaving Israel and it had been 5 years since he had so
departed. Although the father contacted authorities in Tel Aviv in the same
month as the child had been removed, it was a year before the child could be
located and the following 4 years were taken up with a series of applications,
judicial decisions and appeals, before the matter came before the Grand
Chamber of the ECtHR. This lengthy period of time unavoidably meant that
evidence was available as to the very settled life he now had in Switzerland and
the extent to which an enforced return to Israel would negatively impact upon
him, and in the circumstances the mother was in a position to demonstrate this
very well. In the course of the judgment of the Grand Chamber, it is obvious
that the established nature of the boy's life in Switzerland, and the significant
passing of time greatly influenced the decision of the court:"
'As regards Noam, the Court notes that he has Swiss nationality and that he
arrived in the country in June 2005 at the age of two. He has been living there
continuously ever since. In the applicant's submission he has settled well and in
2006 started attending a municipal secular day nursery and a State-approved
private Jewish day nursery. He now goes to school in Switzerland and speaks
French. Even though he is at an age where he still had a certain capacity for
adaptation, the fact of being uprooted again from his habitual environment would
probably have serious consequences for him, especially if he returns on his own, as
indicated in the medical reports. His return to Israel cannot therefore be regarded
as beneficial.'
As regards the contentious issue of the abducting parent benefiting from the
act of wrongdoing and the delays typically encountered in the process, the
8 Above n 1 at paras 138-139.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
" Above n 1 at para 147.
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Swiss Government in Neulinger relied upon the position previously adopted by
the ECtHR in Maumousseau and Washington v France1 2 when defending the
orders made by the Federal Court:13
' . . . the aim of the Hague Convention was to prevent the "abducting" parent
from succeeding in legitimating, by the passage of time operating in his or her
favour, a de facto situation which he or she had created unilaterally'
Whilst the Grand Chamber did not comment directly on the benefits, if any,
secured by the applicant mother given the significant passing of time before the
preliminary matter was concluded, it was evidently influenced by the extent to
which the child had settled in Switzerland and by what it perceived as the
'serious consequences' for the child if he was 'uprooted again from his habitual
environment'. 14
Fears that the decision in Neulinger might signal a sea-change in the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and a lowering of the
threshold when invoking the Art 13(b) defence were comprehensively addressed
by the UK Supreme Court in Re E (Children). Most helpfully the decision of
the UK Supreme Court presents a welcome assessment of the interface
between the tripartite of international conventions, namely the European
Convention on Human Rights, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
and the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction.
In Re E (Children), both parties accepted that the removal of the two children
from Norway, their country of origin, was wrongful within the meaning of the
Hague Convention. The children aged 4 and 7 were born in Norway to a
Norwegian father and English mother and had lived there since birth. In
September 2010 their mother brought them to England without the consent of
their father. In accordance with the provisions of the Hague Convention, the
father successfully requested the return of the two children through the
Norwegian authorities. The matter was heard in the English/Welsh courts by
Pauffley J at first instance. Having considered the arrangements and
undertakings proposed by the father the judge rejected the mother's argument
that the risk to her mental health - in the context of alleged violence on the
part of the father, she was diagnosed as suffering from an adjustment disorder
that could deteriorate into self-harm and suicidality if she had to return to
Norway15 - constituted a grave risk of psychological or physical harm to the
children and concluded that it was 'overwhelmingly' in the best interests of the
12 No 39388/05, ECHR 2007 XIII.
13 Above n 1 at para 119. In the earlier case of Maumousseau and Washington v France, above n
12, relied upon by the Swiss governent in Neulinger, it was noted that the mother was in a
position to accompany her child to the state in which he had his habitual residence in order to
assert her rights there. The mother's unrestricted access to that territory and her capacity to
bring proceedings before the courts of that state was regarded as a decisive factor in ordering
the return of the child.
14 Above n 1 at para 147.
" Above n 2 at para 10.
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children to be returned to Norway where the domestic court could determine
the substantive issues relating to their welfare needs and future arrangements.
The subsequent appeal by the mother was rejected; the Court of Appeal16
refused to accept that the decision in Neulinger should precipitate a change in
the approach of domestic courts to the application of Art 13(b) and the
interpretation of the 'best interests of the child'.
At the Supreme Court hearing, the mother in Re E (Children) attempted, as in
the lower court hearings, to rely upon the purportedly more generous approach
to the scope of the Art 13(b) defence, evidenced in Neulinger. The Supreme
Court was quick to note the limited capacity for a court to apply the Art 13(b)
defence, noting that the circumstances awaiting the return of the child would
need to be 'so inimical to the interests of the particular child that it would also
be contrary to the object of the [Hague] Convention to require it', but equally
noting that such narrow application does not prevent a literal interpretation.
The court confirmed that a plain reading of the wording of Art 13(b), and in
particular the 'grave risk [of] . . . physical or psychological harm' requirement,
does not require further elaboration or gloss and thus there is no need for such
an evidentiary burden to be 'narrowly construed'. Rejecting the more restrictive
views of the lower court, the Supreme Court accepted that what constitutes a
'grave' risk to the child can include exposure to the harmful effects of the abuse
of a parent, irrespective of whether it is fact or a mere perception of abuse on
the part of that parent:17
' . . . the words "physical or psychological harm" are not qualified. However, they
do gain colour from the alternative "or otherwise" placed "in an intolerable
situation" . . . Every child has to put up with a certain amount of rough and
tumble, discomfort and distress. It is part of growing up. But there are some things
which it is not reasonable to expect a child to tolerate. Among these, of course, are
physical or psychological abuse or neglect of the child herself. Among these also,
we now understand, can be exposure to the harmful effects of seeing and hearing
the physical or psychological abuse of her own parent . . . the source of it is
irrelevant: eg where a mother's subjective perception of events leads to a mental
illness which could have intolerable consequences for the child.'
However in considering the case before the court, the UKSC, whilst
acknowledging the very real risk to the mother's mental health if the children
were returned to Norway and the detrimental impact of such suffering upon
the children, it was satisfied that the ordering of protective measures would
sufficiently minimise any risk of psychological harm to the children on their
return to Norway.
Ultimately the UKSC noted the limitations of the court's capacity to protect a
child from the identified risk and/or to implement the necessary protective
measures. Given the starting point presumption that the child should be
returned to the country of origin, and the challenges faced by courts beyond
16 E Children FC [2011] EWCA Civ 361.
1 Above n 2 at para 34. Emphasis in the original.
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ordering that protective measures are taken, the UKSC noted the usefulness of
international cooperation between judges in these applications, and further the
effectiveness of introducing international machinery to oversee the protective
measures agreed. This idea was reiterated by the Special Commission on the
practical operation of the Hague Convention when it considered the merits of a
proposal for the establishment of a group of experts to develop principles and
associated practice guides to assist in the cross-jurisdictional management of
allegations of domestic violence in cases where an application has been made
for the return of a child under the provisions of the Hague Convention. 8
Concerns undoubtedly remain where the child is returned to the country of
habitual residence on the basis that protective measures will be put in place, yet
the capacity to supervise and/or enforce those protective measures effectively
remains outside the remit or jurisdiction of the court ordering the return of the
child. Clearly this can affect the existing and future welfare of the child and the
current lack of cross-jurisdictional cooperative structures arguably provides
support for the position asserted in Neulinger.
The ECtHR in Maumousseau and Washington v France had previously refused
to find in favour of the mother who had taken the child to France for holidays
but refused to return her to the United States afterwards. In the circumstances,
it did not allow the Art 8 based arguments made by the mother to override the
positive obligation arising from the Hague Convention of reuniting parents
with their children, identifying the need to strike 'a fair balance between the
competing interests at stake - those of the child, of the two parents, and of
public order'.19 In ordering the return of the child to the United States, the
ECtHR was clearly swayed by what it regarded as the 'in-depth examination'
conducted by the French courts. With reference to this earlier decision, the
Supreme Court in Re E (Children) highlighted the more detailed examinations
being conducted by national courts in child abduction cases, referring, for
example, to the 'in-depth examination of the entire family situation and of a
whole series of factors, in particular of a factual, emotional, psychological,
material and medical nature' as evidenced by the ECtHR in Maumousseau.20
However, the UKSC critically noted that the manner in which this approach
was endorsed by the Grand Chamber in Neulinger appeared to elevate what
could be regarded as good practice in Maumousseau to a 'legal requirement', a
development not supported by the UKSC. Conversely, it was of the view that
doing so 'gives the appearance of turning the swift, summary decision-making
process which is envisaged by the Hague Convention into the full-blown
examination of the child's future in the requested state which it was the very
object of the Hague Convention to avoid'.21 Whereas on the one hand the
Hague Convention mandates a swift summary decision-making process, the
1s Report of Part I of the Sixth Meeting of the Special Commission on the Practical Operation of
the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention and the 1996 Hague Child Protection
Convention, 1-10 June 2011 available at www.hech.net/upload/newsletter/nl20l2tomel8e-p02.
pdf (accessed June 2013).
19 Above n 12 at para 62.
20 Above n 2 at para 20, quoting from para 74 of the judgment in Maumousseau.
21 Ibid at para 22.
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ECtHR in Neulinger envisaged an in-depth examination of the entire family
situation and of a whole series of related factors (as mentioned above). This
obligatory course of action on the part of the domestic court giving rise to a
'balanced and reasonable assessment of the respective interest of each person',
was defended in the course of the Neulinger judgment as necessitated in order
to ensure a fair decision-making process. However, the UKSC advocated the
assessment of the best interests of the child on the basis of two key aspects,
namely 'to be reunited with their parents as soon as possible, so that one does
not gain unfair advantage over the other through the passage of time; and to be
brought up in a 'sound environment' in which they are not at risk of any harm'.
If correctly applied, the UKSC regarded it as 'most unlikely' that there would
be any breach of Art 8 of the ECHR. Thus in striking this fair balance under
the competing provisions of the Hague Convention, the rights under Art 8 and
other relevant provisions of the ECHR should equally remain protected.
Difficulty has evidently arisen in the course of these judgments where the
ECtHR was called on to determine disputes arising in Hague Convention cases.
In this regard it was noted by Wallace and Janeczko that 'the ECtHR tends to
accord national courts with a wide margin of appreciation in assessing the facts
of the case'. 22 It appears that in terms of the co-existence of these three
Conventions and the interplay of the relevant provisions, the Supreme Court
has now confirmed that the guarantees to respect family and private life under
Art 8 must be interpreted and applied in light of both the Hague Convention
and the UNCRC. It appears that so long as the court in receipt of the request
to return the child does not accede to this request mechanically but rather
'examines the case in accordance with the Hague Convention' that decision is
unlikely to violate the requirements of the ECHR. However equally, the UKSC
was at pains to emphasise that Art 8 of the ECHR must not be regarded as
trumping the Hague Convention. The independent importance of the
provisions of the Hague Convention is evident from the extra-judicial
comments made by the President of the ECtHR, and quoted favourably by the
UKSC. With reference to the decision of the ECtHR in Neulinger, the
President rejected any suggestion that the decision should be regarded as
signalling a change in direction in the area of child abduction, emphasising that
'the logic of the Hague Convention is that a child who has been abducted
should be returned to the jurisdiction best-placed to protect his interest and
welfare, and it is only there that his situation should be reviewed in full'. 2 3 Thus
it is apparent that the starting point is one of return but this is now subject to a
more detailed scrutiny of the circumstances prior to ordering the return of the
child.
22 R Wallace and F Janeczko 'E (Children) (FC): the UK Supreme Court Sets the Record
Straight' [2012] IJFL 11-17 at 16.
23 Paper given at the Franco-British-Irish Colloque on Family Law 14 May 2011, cited by Lady
Hale and Lord Wilson, above n 2 at para 25.
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(b) Mediation - 2012 Guide to Good Practice under the Hague
Convention
Between 2011 and 2013 significant progress has been made in relation to the
development of agreed guidelines for the promotion of mediation as a means
of resolving cross-border disputes in international family law. In April 2006,
the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference was mandated by its member
states to 'prepare a feasibility study on cross-border mediation in family
matters, including the possible development of an instrument on the subject'.24
Following on from the existing Guides to Good Practice in respect of the
workings of the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction,25 the Feasibility Study on Cross-Border Mediation in Family Law
Matters, which explored areas for consideration in the context of mediation
and other methods of bringing about agreed solutions in international family
law, was presented to the Council on General Affairs and Policy at the 2007
Conference. Upon receipt of comments from Hague Conference members on
this feasibility study, the Permanent Bureau commenced work in 2009 on a
Guide to Good Practice in Mediation, assisted by a group of invited
independent experts from different contracting states. Following the
publication and distribution of a number of draft guides, the revised version
was circulated in early 2012 to members and contracting states for final
consultation and the Guide to Good Practice under the Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction was published in 2012.26
The aim of the Guide is expressly stated as follows: 2 7
'The Guide promotes good practices in mediation and other processes to bring
about the agreed resolution of international family disputes concerning children
which fall within the scope of the Hague Convention'.
This emphasis upon the importance of mediation is regarded as a continuation
of the position adopted in other modern Hague Conventions which have
encouraged the amicable resolution of family law disputes and expressly
mentioned the use of mediation, reconciliation and other alternative dispute
resolution methods. 28 The Guide has been developed as a means of providing
'assistance to State Parties to the 1980 Convention, but also to State Parties to
24 Conclusions of the Special Commission of 3-5 April 2006 on General Affairs and Policy of
the Conference, Recommendation No 3.
25 Four Guides to Good Practice had previously been published; Part I - Central Authority
Practice (2003); Part II - Implementing Measures (2003); Part III - Preventive measures
(2005); Part IV - Enforcement (2010).
26 See www.hech.net/upload/guide28mediation-en.pdf (accessed June 2013).
27 Ibid at p 12.
28 Article 31(b) of the Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law,
Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and
Measures for the Protection of Children; Art 31 of the Hague Convention of 13 January 2000
on the International Protection of Adults; and Arts 6(2)(d), 34(2)(i) of the Hague Convention
of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and other Forms of
Family Maintenance.
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other Hague Conventions that promote the use of mediation, conciliation or
similar means to facilitate agreed solutions in international family disputes'. 29
In emphasising the general importance of promoting inter parte agreements in
cross-border family disputes over custody and contact, the Guide notes the
increasing use of mediation and similar processes to facilitate the amicable
resolution of disputes in family law in many countries, and more broadly,
points to the increased number of states that now encourage more party
autonomy in resolving disputes, whilst safeguarding the rights of third parties,
especially children. 30 Given the ongoing need for parents to continue to
maintain cooperative relations with each other irrespective of the terms of the
arrangements made for the care and custody of the child, a dispute that is to
some or all extent negotiated between them is a far more positive approach to
resolution and much more likely to be adhered to in an amicable manner. The
removal of a judicial dictate and the lessening of inter parte conflict lends itself
to a more workable relationship between the parents, of undoubted benefit to
the child at the centre of the dispute. Thus the Guide points to the
communication facilitated between the parties, the structure that nonetheless
incorporates flexibility and subjective arrangements, the possibility for early
intervention, the avoidance of cumbersome legal proceedings and the
associated cost-effectiveness brought about by mediation.31
Given the challenges and complexities of international family mediation, the
Guide has emphasised the importance of mediators having relevant additional
training.32 It points expressly to the difficulties in mediation arising from the
'interplay of two different legal systems different cultures and languages' and
the importance of properly understanding and taking into account the impact
in different jurisdictions of the legal effect of mediated agreements and the
long-term consequences of the arrangements made. Thus given the
involvement of more than one legal system, parties need to have access to the
legal information relevant to these jurisdictions and a means of understanding
the applicable international legal framework. 33 The Guide also addresses the
issues of cost, access, scope and models of mediation, the importance of the
involvement of the child and the possible involvement of third persons in the
mediation process. In light of the nature of mediation and the manner in which
the process and outcomes are effectively 'owned' by the parties involved, the
Guide does not seek to place any particular onus on central authorities in
developing the mediation processes in international child abduction disputes.
However, with reference to Art 7 of the 1980 Convention which states that
29 Above n 26 at p 12. The Guide declares itself to be addressed to governments and central
authorities appointed under the 1980 Convention and under other relevant Hague
Conventions, as well as judges, lawyers, mediators, parties to cross-border family disputes and
other interested individuals.
30 Ibid at p 21, para 31.
31 Ibid at pp 21-22.
32 Ibid. At section 3, paras 90-110, the Guide sets out the detail relating to the need for
specialised training for mediation in international child abduction cases in order to safeguard
the quality of the mediation provided.
3 Ibid at p 30, paras 66-70.
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central authorities 'shall take all appropriate measures . . . to secure the
voluntary return of the child or to bring about an amicable resolution of the
issues', s 9.2 expressly encourages central authorities 'to take a pro-active and
hands-on approach in carrying out their respective functions in international
access/contact cases'. 34 The Guide points to the 'considerable assistance' that
central authorities can provide in arranging for interim contact between the
left-behind parent and the abducted child. Additionally the Guide emphasises
the important role that the central authorities can play in arranging the
necessary protective measures.35
In 2012 at the Sixth Meeting of the Special Commission on the Practical
Operation of the 1980 and 1996 Conventions (Part II),36 mediation was
identified as a key topic for further consideration, and its potential for broader
use in family law was highlighted. The Permanent Bureau noted,
notwithstanding the long history and work of the Hague Conference in the
field of cross-border mediation, the 'significant practical challenges' identified
by the discussion of the 2011 Special Commission (Part I) concerning the
enforceability of mediated agreements which, given the multiplicity of issues
they might cover, could cause practical challenges, arising especially in the
context of the multiple jurisdictions necessarily involved. Additionally,
notwithstanding the fact of an agreement, achieved through mediation, the
recognition and enforcement of the terms of that agreement can themselves
give rise to a 'lengthy, cumbersome and expensive' process.
However, the Permanent Bureau, whilst noting the reservations of a number of
experts present at the April 2012 Commission relating to the possible impact of
further work on mediation and its capacity to divert attention and resources
away from the original purpose of the Hague Convention, namely the
expeditious return of the child and the need to allow the 1996 Convention the
opportunity to prove its effectiveness before deciding on a new binding
instrument, has recommended the establishment of an exploratory expert
group on mediated agreements. To progress the issue and establish an
environment conducive to the creation and enforcement of mediated
agreements, the 2012 Council mandated the Hague Conference to 'establish an
Experts' Group to carry out further exploratory research on cross-border
recognition and enforcement of agreements reached in the course of
international child disputes, including those reached through mediation, taking
into account the implementation and use of the 1996 Convention', calling on
this group to identify 'the nature and extent of the legal and practical problems,
including jurisdictional issues' in this area.37 The importance and value of a
34 Ibid at p 72, para 260, with reference to the Conclusions and Recommendation of Part I of the
Sixth Meeting of the Special Commission on the practical operation of the 1980 Hague Child
Abduction Convention and the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention.
3 Ibid.
36 Held in The Hague on 25-31 January 2012.
3 Conclusions and Recommendations adopted by the Council on General Affairs and Policy of
the Conference (17 20 April 2012); recommendation no 37.
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'global instrument' on mediated agreements was emphasised given the
international context and the assistance such an instrument would provide.
The potential for a free-standing instrument on mediated agreements, a
consideration of related alternative dispute mechanisms and the ongoing
challenges relating to the recognition and enforcement of mediated agreements
remain key issues for consideration, but it is apparent that mediation as an
effective means of resolving international family disputes remains a priority in
the context of the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction.
Ultimately these developments are to be both welcomed and encouraged, it is
commendable that there is a growing awareness of the practical difficulties that
habitually arise and the capacity for mediation to develop more conciliatory
and nuanced approaches to the resolution of these cases.
II EUROPEAN INFLUENCES ON FAMILY LAW - THE
IMPACT OF ROME III
Rome III represents the most recent development in ongoing attempts by the
law and policy-makers of the European Union to move towards a more
harmonised system of family law in a European context. Whilst it remains
generally accepted that the EU has no competence under the EC Treaty to
enact legislation governing substantive national family law provisions, it does
and has for some time exercised jurisdiction in respect of the enforcement of
existing domestic orders. The importance placed upon cross-European judicial
cooperation in civil law matters formed the basis of the Judicial Cooperation in
Civil Matters (Treaty of Amsterdam) (1998) and this has created the gateway
through which the general area of international family law has been introduced
into the EC Treaty.38
More broadly, the EU has had competence in respect of the recognition and
enforcement of judgments since Brussels I, but given the traditional reluctance
to impose regulations on member states in this area of social policy, Brussels I
did not apply to judgments affecting matrimonial property, save in respect of
maintenance orders. Subsequently, family law judgments were included within
the remit and effect of Brussels II, and its successor Brussels II hiS. 3 9 The
general objective of the European Union to 'create an area of freedom, security
and justice, in which the free movement of persons is ensured' mandated the
38 A Fiorini 'Rome III - Choice of Law in Divorce: Is the Europeanization of Family Law Going
Too Far?' (2008) 22 IJLP&F 178. Fiorini explains at 179, 180 the aims of the Vienna Action
Plan of December 1998 as being 'to make life simpler for European citizens by improving and
simplifying the rules and procedures on cooperation and communication between authorities
and on enforcing decisions, by promoting the compatibility of conflict of law rules and on
jurisdiction and by eliminating obstacles to the good functioning of civil proceedings in a
European judicial area'.
39 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 Concerning Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and the Matters of
Parental Responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000.
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adoption of measures 'in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters that
are necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market' 40 and this was
extended to family law matters by Brussels II his which concerns the issues of
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial
matters and in matters of parental responsibility. However, whilst its provisions
apply to the dissolution of matrimonial ties, it does not address issues such as
the grounds for divorce, property consequences of the marriage or any other
ancillary matters. 41 Evidently European governance in this area has taken very
small steps, avoiding the imposition of cross-member-state standards,
preferring to create structures for the recognition and enforcement of those
orders determined exclusively by domestic legal systems. Additionally the
provisions of Brussels II his do not apply to maintenance arrangements, 42 as
they were (then) separately covered by Council Regulation 44/2001. The most
recent developments have seen the maintenance element of Brussels I being
replaced by the Maintenance Regulation, Council Regulation 4/200943 which
has had direct effect on all member states since 18 June 2011 and Brussels II
his, insofar as it relates to family law judgments, being replaced in those
member states opting in, by Rome III.44
Rome III was initially drafted with a view to addressing the shortcomings of
Brussels II his namely, to tackle the difficult issue of where to best file
proceedings upon marital breakdown. Whilst the rules are relatively well settled
in respect of the recognition and enforcement of family law judgments, there
remained an ongoing lack of clarity as to uniform choice of law rules. The
European Commission cited the growing mobility of citizens within the EU,
and thus the increasing number of international couples, together with the high
divorce rates as the general context within which the Proposal for the
amendment of Brussels II his was made.45 What is most obvious from the
proposals which grounded Rome III is the desire on the part of European
law-makers to create a system of rules on applicable law, which had been absent
from Brussels 1,46 Brussels II and Brussels II his. 4 7 Thus at proposal stage, the
40 Ibid, recital 1.
41 Ibid, recital 8.
42 Ibid, recital 11 - Maintenance obligations are excluded from the scope of this Regulation as
these are already covered by Council Regulation No 44/2001. The courts having jurisdiction
under this Regulation will generally have jurisdiction to rule on maintenance obligations by
application of Article 5(2) of Council Regulation No 44/2001.
43 [2008] OJ L7/1.
44 Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced
cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation.
45 Proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 as regards
jurisdiction and introducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters (17/7/2006
COM (2006) 399 Final).
46 The first Community instrument in the area of family law, Council Regulation (EC)
No 1347/2000 set out rules on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments in
matrimonial matters as well as judgments on parental responsibility for children of both
spouses given in the context of a matrimonial proceeding. It did not include rules on applicable
law.
47 Neither Brussels II nor Brussels II bis addressed the issue of applicable law, carrying over for
the most part, the provisions on matrimonial matters from Brussels I. Brussels II bis did allow
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primary objectives of Rome III were stated by the Commission as being 'to
provide a clear and comprehensive legal framework in matrimonial matters in
the European Union and ensure adequate solutions to the citizens in terms of
legal certainty, predictability, flexibility and access to court'. 48 Consequently,
Rome III, reflects the international trend favouring private ordering and the
development of regimes which facilitate the exercise of private autonomy by
couples in the context of relationship breakdown, and sought to create a body
of rules on the law applicable on separation or divorce, either based on the
agreed election by the parties or with reference to a hierarchy of rules to
determine the applicable law. Thus whilst falling well short of creating or
harmonising the laws of member states, it does seek to impose a structure for
the law to be applied in each instance. However, in light of the failure by all
member states to agree to the introduction of Rome III and its necessary
introduction by way of enhanced cooperation, Brussels II his continues to act
as a key regulatory measure, and remains the governing EU cooperation and
recognition mechanism for the 12 EU member states not signatories to the
Rome III Regulation. 49
(a) Shortcomings of Brussels II bis
Article 3 of the Brussels II his addresses the jurisdiction of the courts of the
member states but in so doing does not create any hierarchy of rules or
principles. This is what is regarded as one of the key weaknesses of the
structures imposed by Brussels II his, the priority accorded to the laws of the
jurisdiction where proceedings are first issued and ultimately was one of the
key motivators in drafting Rome III. Thus in matters relating to divorce, legal
separation or marriage annulment, Art 3 provides that jurisdiction shall lie with
the courts of the member state in whose territory one of the seven, identified
grounds can be proven.50
Brussels II his identifies seven possible, unranked grounds on the basis of which
jurisdiction can be asserted, the extensive scope of which permits the legitimate
spouses to choose between alternative grounds of jurisdiction. Once proceedings issued, the
decision regarding the applicable law is determined by the court with seising of those
proceedings based upon the national conflict of law rules of that state, and unhelpfully varying
approaches to this issue co-existed in member states.
48 Above n 38 at 180, 181, quoting from para 5 of the proposal for a Council Regulation
amending Regulation (EC) No 2201/2203 as regards jurisdiction and introducing rules
applicable law in matrimonial matters, SEC (2006) 949, 23.
49 The 12 member states not party to the enhanced cooperation procedure are; Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia,
Sweden and the United Kingdom.
50 Article 3(1)(a)-(b). Further, Art 5 of the Regulation provides that without prejudice to these
provisions, a court of a member state that has given a judgment on a legal separation shall also
have jurisdiction for converting that judgment into a divorce, if the law of that member state so
provides.
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issuing of proceedings in a number of member states. 51 The lack of hierarchy
amongst these stated grounds accords the power to choose the jurisdiction to
one or other of the parties and fails to impose any principle-based
identification of appropriate jurisdiction. The obvious consequence of this
approach is to encourage a party to issue proceedings without delay in order to
lay claim upon the jurisdiction whose rules promote the most favourable
outcome for that party. From a policy viewpoint this has a very negative impact
upon the possibility of a more conciliatory approach through inter parte
negotiations or mediation, arising from an entirely reasonable fear of being
'beaten' to the choice of jurisdiction. Very obviously this can give rise to a
number of problems, namely: an underlying lack of certainty and predictability
inherent in the process, an associated incentive for parties to rush to litigation
and shun more conciliatory approaches as well as a real possibility of outcomes
that do not reflect the original and legitimate expectations of the parties to the
marriage. 52
Additionally Brussels II his removed the safeguard of the capacity to invoke the
principle forum non conveniens by the courts which had permitted the staying
of proceedings, premised upon the notion that a jurisdiction other than place
of issue might be better suited to hear the suit, the fact and identity of that
better placed jurisdiction to be determined by the court.53 However the
retention of the lex fori principle, which requires the application of the laws of
the jurisdiction where proceedings have issued, merely serves to strengthen the
capacity and practice for forum shopping, crudely imposing without question
the laws of the jurisdiction first seised of the action. The associated obligation
on the court second seised of proceedings relating to divorce, legal separation
or marriage annulment, to stay its proceedings until such time as the
jurisdiction of the court first seised is established strongly favours the rights of
the person who has filed first and engenders a practice of 'race to issue', in
order for one party to successfully claim a favourable jurisdiction. 54
51 Under Art 3 proceedings could legitimately issue in the member state where:
the spouses are habitually resident, or
the spouses were last habitually resident, insofar as one of them still resides there, or
the respondent is habitually resident, or
in the event of a joint application, either of the spouses is habitually resident, or
the applicant is habitually resident if he or she is resided there for at least a year
immediately before the application was made, or
- the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least six months
immediately before the application was made and is either a national of the Member State in
question or, in the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland, has his or her "domicile" there.'
52 See further the original Commission proposal to amend Brussels II, above n 45 at pp 3-4.
5 The European Court of Justice confirmed the removal of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens as a valid basis for refusing to hear proceedings in C-281/02 - Owusu v NB Jackson
and Others [2005] ECR 1-1383. The overriding aims of the EU appear to have been the creation
of harmonised jurisdictional rules across the EU and to eliminate the discretion previously
exercisable by individual courts.
54 Article 19 of Brussels II bis. Once the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established the
court second seised is obliged under Art 19(3) to decline jurisdiction in favour of that court.
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(b) Rome III - Council Regulation 125912010 implementing
enhanced cooperation in the area of law applicable to divorce and
legal separation
Following the grant of authorisation by the Council for the implementation of
the Council Regulation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal
separation through the enhanced cooperation process, 55 Council Regula-
tion 1259/2010 was published. Although multifaceted, the essence of the
Regulation was the creation of uniform rules on the law applicable to divorce
and legal separation, regulating the manner in which parties can agree to
collectively elect the applicable law56 or, in the absence of such agreement, the
creation of a hierarchy of rules which will dictate the applicable law.5 7
Article 5 outlines the manner in which the spouses can collectively elect the law
to apply to the determination of their separation or divorce. Spouses can agree
to designate the law applicable to divorce and legal separation provided that it
is one of the following laws:
'(a) the law of the State where the spouses are habitually resident at the time the
agreement is concluded; or
(b) the law of the State where the spouses were last habitually resident, in so far
as one of them still resides there at the time the agreement is concluded; or
(c) the law of the State of nationality of either spouse at the time the agreement
is concluded; or
(d) the law of the forum.'
An added interesting dimension to these attempts to develop some element of EU-wide
governance in family law is the manner in which the provisions of Rome III have been
introduced. Given the lack of consensus between member states and the fact that only 14
member states have agreed to be bound by these provisions, the enactment of these provisions
in the form of a Council Regulation has required reliance upon the enhanced cooperation
mechanism. This process allows a minimum of nine EU member states to establish advanced
integration or cooperation in an area within EU structures where not all member states are in
agreement.
16 Above n 44.
Ibid, Art 8. Following the publication by the Commission in 2006 of the proposed Regulation,
the lack of unanimity on the proposal was confirmed by the Council in 2008. In order to be
able to progress the proposal further the 15 jurisdictions in support of the proposal sought to
establish an enhanced cooperation between them with a view to creating provisions binding
upon participating member states. This process of enhanced cooperation in the area of
applicable law on divorce and legal separation received Council approval in July 2010, leading
to the publication of the Council Regulation (Rome III) in December 2010, with effect in the
acceding member states since June 2012. The 15 participating states were identified in recital 6
of Council Regulation 1259/2010 as Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy,
Latvia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia; Greece
withdrew its support in March 2010. Lithuania subsequently joined the enhanced cooperation
process, its participation was approved by the Council in November 2012, and the laws will
have effect in Lithuania from May 2014.
If the law of the forum so provides, the spouses may also designate the law applicable before
the court during the course of the proceeding. In that event, such designation shall be recorded
in court in accordance with the law of the forum - Art 5(3). Without prejudice to this
provision, an agreement designating the applicable law can be concluded and modified at any
time, but no later than the time the court is seised - Art 5(2).
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Article 8 provides a co-existing structure to govern circumstances where the
parties have not or cannot agree to the applicable law to govern their divorce or
legal separation. In the absence of a choice of applicable law under Art 5 of the
Regulation, the divorce or legal separation will be subject to the law of the
state:
'(a) where the spouses are habitually resident at the time the court is seized; or,
failing that
(b) where the spouses were last habitually resident, provided that the period of
residence did not end more than 1 year before the court was seized, in so far
as one of the spouses still resides in that State at the time the court is seized;
or failing that
(c) of which both spouses are nationals at the time the court is seized; or failing
that
(d) where the court is seized.'
Certainly, the legislative policy behind the enactment of Rome III is more
evident than that underlying the previous Brussels regulations, given its
development of a predictable and considered system of applicable law and the
creation in the abstract, of a system of governance in the context of
cross-jurisdictional disputes. However, shortcomings remain, most especially in
respect of the common law/civil law divide which it amplifies, the perception
being that the EU is both driven and dominated by civil law European
jurisdictions. Whilst it is not a novel matter for civil law countries to apply the
law of a country where parties to a dispute have a particular connection,
common law jurisdictions are very opposed to the notion of determining a
dispute with reference to the laws of another jurisdiction, placing the aims of
Rome III quite beyond the comfort zone of those presiding in common law
jurisdictions. Interestingly however, the decision of the UK Supreme Court in
Radmacher v Granatino59 untypically saw the marked influence of the laws of
Germany in the determination of the divorce hearing and the effective
implementation of the prenuptial agreement between the parties. It
demonstrated a significant willingness to look to the substantive provisions of
another jurisdiction and a notable shift away from the absolute application of
the principle of lex fori and arguably represents a tentative approval of
applicable law choices.
Of course from a practice viewpoint, a key challenge arising from the
provisions of Rome III is the capacity of a domestic court to correctly
understand and apply the laws of another member state. This challenge is
further compounded by Art 4 which provides that the law designated by virtue
of the application of the provisions of Rome III shall apply, whether or not it is
the law of a participating state. This universal application provision makes it
possible that in appropriate circumstances the law of any international
jurisdiction might apply. Given the reliance in family law proceedings upon
perceived values of fairness, equality and equity, as well as the influences of
domestic cultures and social policies, significant challenges exist in relation to
59 Radmacher v Granatino [2011] AC 534.
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interpretations and understanding. Whilst this predetermination of the rules of
applicable law creates certainty as well as principle-based resolution where inter
parte agreement cannot be reached, the outcomes of a case decided in a
country applying its own laws as distinct from the outcomes in another country
applying those same rules can differ dramatically. It is certainly arguable that a
more effective approach, giving rise to a greater purity of application, would be
to give the parties the capacity to elect the applicable jurisdiction and then
apply the lex fori. Such an arrangement would allow the parties to elect the
applicable law, which in turn would be applied by informed and experienced
judges. These perceived shortcomings are only added to by the fact that 12 EU
member states remain outside the provisions of Rome III, and thus continue to
be governed by the structures and rules of Brussels II his. The impact of this
fragmented approach to governance is difficult to predict but seems far from
the outcome originally anticipated by those seeking to harmonise the
recognition and enforcement of domestic orders within member states.
(c) Maintenance - Council Regulation 4/2009 on jurisdiction,
applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and
cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations
Commonly known as the Maintenance Regulation, Council Regulation 4/2009
addresses issues of maintenance in a cross-border context and is directly
applicable in all EU member states from 18 June 2011. In essence the aim of the
Maintenance Regulation is to provide a set of common rules relating to
jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, enforcement, cooperation and
standardised documents to facilitate the effective recovery of maintenance
within the European Union. The Regulation forms part of a concerted effort in
relation to civil law matters generally, but also within family law to develop
insofar as is possible, a suite of legislative enactments to further bring about
mutuality of recognition and enforcement of orders, and reflects the shift
towards agreeing rules on applicable laws. 60 The Maintenance Regulation is a
dedicated family law measure and replaces the related provisions of Brussels I,
60 Recital 3 recognises the multiple EU enactments that seek to collectively address these
long-standing issues in order to better achieve the aims of cross-border freedom and a better
functioning of the internal market. In this respect, the Community has among other measures
already adopted Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, Council
Decision 2001/470/EC of 28 May 2001 establishing a European Judicial Network in civil and
commercial matters, Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation
between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial
matters, Council Directive 2003/8/EC of 27 January 2003 to improve access to justice in
cross-border disputes by establishing minimum common rules relating to legal aid for such
disputes, Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental
responsibility, Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims, and
Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
November 2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in
civil or commercial matters (service of documents).
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which covered civil litigation more broadly. Although the Regulation certainly
covers the traditional concept of maintenance, ie inter spousal or parent-child
financial support through lump sum or periodical payments, it also has the
potential to apply to transfers of property where the aim of such a transfer is to
provide for the needs, including accommodation needs of the spouse and/or
child(ren).61 The scope of what is covered by the Regulations is also not certain,
recital 11 requires that the term 'maintenance obligation' be interpreted
autonomously, and the ruling of the ECJ in Van den Boogard v Laumen62
demonstrates the latitude likely to be given to the concept of maintenance. In
that decision, the ECJ confirmed that where 'provision awarded is designed to
enable one spouse to provide for himself or herself or if the needs and
resources of each of the spouses are taken into consideration in the
determination of its amount, the decision will be concerned with
maintenance'. 63 It further confirmed that the classification of the provision
ordered as maintenance is not affected by whether payment is provided for in
the form of a lump sum or periodical payments. A lump sum payment
remained within the remit of Brussels I (in this case) given that the capital sum
was designed to ensure a predetermined level of income.64
In 1999, the European Council invited the Council and the Commission to
establish special common procedural rules to simplify and accelerate the
settlement of cross-border disputes concerning, inter alia, maintenance claims.
Additionally it also sought the abolition of the existing intermediate measures
required for the recognition and enforcement in the requested state of a
decision given in another member state, particularly a decision relating to a
maintenance claim. 65 In November 2004, the European Council adopted a new
programme entitled 'The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security
and justice in the European Union' and in 2005, the Council adopted an action
plan to implement the Hague Programme including specific reference to the
need for proposals concerning maintenance obligations. The important issue of
jurisdiction is governed by Arts 3 and 4; Art 4 permits the parties to agree to
elect the jurisdiction to govern the issue of maintenance providing that they do
so in writing, choosing from one of the options identified in Art 4:66
61 The Regulation does not define 'maintenance obligations', stating only that the scope of the
Regulation should cover all maintenance obligations arising from a family relationship,
parentage, marriage or affinity; see recital 11 and Art 1 of the Regulation.
62 (1997) ECR 1-1147.
63 Ibid at para 22. Conversely the court noted that 'where the provision awarded is solely
concerned with dividing property between the spouses, the decision will be concerned with
rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship' and therefore be enforceable as a
maintenance payment (under Brussels I in that case).
64 Ibid at para 23. Consequently, it was concluded by the ECJ in Van den Boogard v Laumen,
above n 62, at para 27 that 'a decision rendered in divorce proceedings ordering payment of a
lump sum and transfer of ownership in certain property by one party to his or her former
spouse must be regarded as relating to maintenance and therefore as falling within the scope of
the Brussels Convention if its purpose is to ensure the former spouse's maintenance'.
6' Recitals 4-5; Council Regulation 4/2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and
enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations.
66 Ibid. Furthermore Art 4 provides that the conditions relied upon to agree jurisdiction must
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'(a) a court or the courts of a Member State in which one of the parties is
habitually resident;
(b) a court or the courts of a Member State of which one of the parties has the
nationality;
(c) in the case of maintenance obligations between spouses or former spouses:
(i) the court which has jurisdiction to settle their dispute in matrimonial
matters; or
(ii) a court or the courts of the Member State which was the Member
State of the spouses' last common habitual residence for a period of at
least one year.'
Notably, although Art 4 permits the parties to agree to elect the jurisdiction to
govern the issue of maintenance, Art 3 provides that in the absence of such
agreement a member state will have valid jurisdiction to make a maintenance
order where:
'(a) the defendant is habitually resident there, or
(b) the creditor is habitually resident there, or
(c) according to its own laws, the court has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings
concerning the status of a person if the matter relating to maintenance is
ancillary to those proceedings, unless that jurisdiction is based solely on the
nationality of one of the parties, or
(d) according to its own laws, the court has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings
concerning parental responsibility if the matter relating to maintenance is
ancillary to those proceedings, unless that jurisdiction is based solely on the
nationality of one of the parties.'
Importantly, Art 4(3) expressly excludes the right of the parties to elect
jurisdiction from applying in disputes concerning child maintenance.
Given that one of the primary aims of the Regulation is to ensure that a
maintenance creditor can easily obtain in a member state a decision which will
be automatically enforceable in another member state without further
formalities, 67 the Maintenance Regulation includes measures relating to
jurisdiction, conflict of laws, recognition and enforceability, enforcement and
legal aid, and is designed to bring about cooperation between central
authorities. 68 The obligation for the terms of the original order to be enforced
without modification is very definite within the terms of the Regulation, and
under no circumstances may a decision given in a member state be reviewed as
to its substance in the member state in which recognition and enforcement is
exist at the time the choice of court agreement is concluded or at the time the court is seised.
Additionally, the jurisdiction conferred by agreement shall be exclusive unless the parties have
agreed otherwise.
67 Ibid, recital 9.
68 Ibid, recital 10.
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sought.69 Thus the net effect of the Regulations is to bar the ability of the court
of a member state not seised of the action from making new or associated
orders. 70
The breadth of the potential scope of the Maintenance Regulation has caused
concern given the obligation on a member state to give effect to orders from
other jurisdictions where maintenance obligations arise from family
relationships, parentage, marriage or affinity, where such legal obligations, for
example in the case of obligations rising from affinity, may not exist in the
jurisdiction where enforcement is sought (but now guaranteed under the terms
of the Regulation). However, the impact of this imposition of standards and
entitlements arising in other jurisdictions is tempered by recitals 21 and 25; the
former confirms that the rules 'determine only the law applicable to
maintenance obligations and do not determine the law applicable to the
establishment of the family relationships on which the maintenance obligations
are based'7 1 and the latter limits the recognition on the part of the enforcing
state to the entitlement to recover the maintenance debt owed, confirming that
such enforcement does 'not imply the recognition by that Member State of the
family relationship, parentage, marriage or affinity underlying the maintenance
obligations which gave rise to the decision'. However, the inability to query or
amend the existing order does mean that a member state court will now be
obliged to automatically give effect to the maintenance entitlements, even if the
relationship upon which those rights are based is not one that is legally
recognised in the enforcing jurisdiction.
The broader objective of harmonised family law provisions across the
European Union still appears beyond reach. The dramatically varying
perceptions of maintenance and property entitlements across Europe mean
that the attempts to regularise and harmonise the position necessarily stops at
the capacity to identify the most appropriate forum. Any movement towards a
harmonisation of the substantive provisions would fail to overcome the
fundamentally distinctive approaches of the individual member states.
Boele-Woelki has noted this lack of significant capacity to harmonise the
substantive provisions of family law across European member states given
'there is neither the political will nor any legislative competence for the EU to
do this'. 72 The cultural constraints arising from the distinctly varying
approaches of individual member states is likely to prevent the development of
a 'pan-European culture' at any time soon.
69 Ibid, Art 42.
7o For a broad overview of the Maintenance Regulation, see D Eames 'The New EU
Maintenance Regulation: A Different Outcome in Radmacher v Granatino?' [2011] Fam Law
389-393.
7 Rather, Art 21 states that the establishment of family relationships continues to be covered by
the national law of the member states, including their rules of private international law.
72 K Boele-Woelki 'The European Agenda: an Overview of the Current Situation in the Field of
Private International Law and Substantive Law' [2006] IFL 148.
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III PRIVATE ORDERING - A CONTINUAL SHIFT IN
FAVOUR OF ENFORCEABLE MARITAL AGREEMENTS
When examined across multiple jurisdictions, it is evident that distinct
regulatory approaches exist in respect of the governance of asset distribution
on marital breakdown. The substance of these approaches varies significantly,
and they are impacted by numerous issues, including the concept of marital
property, perceptions of need and spousal entitlements, expectations regarding
the financial rehabilitation of dependent spouses and the capacity for a clean
financial break. The issue of private ordering and the support for the creation
of regulatory structures which facilitate and give effect to the autonomous
decision-making powers of couples on relationship breakdown is another
factor, and one which is very much growing in significance. However, the extent
to which a married couple can elect to sidestep the governing rules of their
jurisdiction and self-determine the details of their marriage dissolution in
respect of asset distribution and ongoing financial ties is very much dependent
upon the laws in individual jurisdictions. 73 Certainly, some jurisdictions,
including the common law jurisdictions of Ireland and England and Wales,
adopt strict policy positions in respect of the importance of state retention of
residual control over the interspousal obligation to make proper financial
provision for the dependent spouse and any children of the marriage and thus
the capacity to entirely avoid the governing regulatory structure is not possible.
Conversely the approach of many European civil law jurisdictions includes a
respect for the parties' autonomous arrangements, representing an interesting
contrast to the common law jurisdictions where reliance upon judicial
discretion remains dominant. In most civil law jurisdictions, giving effect to a
properly executed agreement by two consenting, informed parties does not
receive any special treatment under the principles of contract law. Whilst the
resolution by parties of the terms of their dissolution after breakdown has long
been endorsed by many jurisdictions, there is now an increased tendency to
address the issues prior to even the solemnisation of the marriage by way of
prenuptial agreement.74
The growing importance of private ordering and the creation of regulatory
structures which facilitate the private autonomy of individual couples were
evident in the 2012 publication of Marital Agreements and Private Autonomy in
Comparative Perspective which presents a comparative statement of the relevant
laws of 14 jurisdictions, setting out the different matrimonial property regimes
and related rules on marital agreements. 75 The project, the brainchild of
7 The possibility of parties executing a matrimonial agreement is envisaged by most
jurisdictions, but not all forms of agreement are necessarily recognised or indeed expressly
enforceable.
74 The collective concept of marital property agreements includes prenuptial agreements,
post-nuptial agreements and separation agreements, which ultimately can form the basis and in
some jurisdictions, the terms of the marital dissolution. The growth in importance of these
agreements is reflected in the significant attention given to them by academics and law-makers
as well as their increased use in practice.
7 JM Scherpe (ed) Marital Agreements and Private Autonomy in Comparative Perspective (Hart
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Dr Jens Scherpe, which was launched at a 2-day conference in June 2010 at
Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, provides a very useful overview of
existing approaches, outlining the regulatory framework in each jurisdiction
including the default rules applied by the courts, in respect of the distribution
of marital and other relevant assets. The status and impact of marital
agreements in each of the jurisdictions are outlined, and for the most part the
work demonstrates a favourable approach to private ordering and a discernible
regulatory preference for the use of marital agreements. The distinctions in
treatment across the jurisdictions considered arise typically in relation to the
extent to which the agreements are enforceable as drafted, and the co-existing
right, if any, of state supervision and intervention. Additionally, where the law
in a jurisdiction is in transition or indeed in need of reform, the relevant
chapters explore the recommendations for change.
(a) Current developments in England and Wales
Perhaps the jurisdiction currently most engaged with the issue of private
ordering and the reform of existing regulatory structures to govern the
recognition and enforcement of marital agreements is England and Wales, and
for two distinct reasons. The English Law Commission is currently nearing the
end of a 3-year project on marital property agreements, which seeks to
determine the extent to which the financial consequences of divorce or
dissolution can be resolved by agreement in advance, before a separation is
finalised.76 This necessitated an examination of the law relating to prenuptial
agreements, post-nuptial agreements and separation agreements and it is noted
in the Consultation Paper that this project was undertaken in the context of a
number of recent high profile cases where the resolution of the ancillary relief
issues in the context of a marriage dissolution was 'determined, or heavily
influenced, by a pre-nuptial or post-nuptial agreement'.77
Secondly, the restatement by the Supreme Court in Radmacher v Granatino7 s of
the law relating to prenuptial agreements in England and Wales has brought the
matter even more to the fore and demonstrates a very definite policy shift in
support of the autonomy of individuals and the significant weight that can be
Publishing, 2012). The book examines the relevant laws of 14 jurisdictions; England and
Wales, Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Scotland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden and the United States.
6 The terms of reference for the project were set out formally in the Tenth Programme of Law
Reform as follows: 'The project will examine the status and enforceability of agreements made
between spouses and civil partners (or those contemplating marriage or civil partnership)
concerning their property and finances. Such agreements might regulate the couple's financial
affairs during the course of their relationship; equally they might seek to determine how the
parties would divide their property in the event of divorce, dissolution or separation. They
might be made before marriage (often called 'pre-nups') or during the course of the marriage
or civil partnership. They need not be made in anticipation of impending separation; but they
might constitute separation agreements reached at the point of relationship breakdown.' Tenth
Programme of Law Reform (2007) Law Com No 311, paras 2.17 to 2.18.
Marital Property Agreements Law Com Consultation Paper No 198 at para 1.4.
7 Radmacher v Granatino [2011] AC 534; [2010] UKSC 42.
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attached to private contracts, even in the context of marital breakdown.
Although in Radmacher v Granatino the court did not go so far as to permit the
parties to simply oust the jurisdiction of the court and enforce the terms of the
prenuptial agreement, the Supreme Court did confirm its obligation to 'give
appropriate weight to the agreement' which in this instance ultimately required
the court to essentially give effect to the terms of the agreement. The majority
decision (7:2) saw the appellant husband being denied his claim for a share in
the vast wealth of the respondent, on the basis that this is what was dictated by
the prenuptial agreement and the circumstances in which the agreement was
entered into demonstrated that he 'had well understood the effect of the
agreement, had had the opportunity to take independent advice, but had failed
to do so . . . [and] the absence of negotiations merely reflected the fact that the
background of the parties rendered the entry into such an agreement
commonplace'.79 Importantly when considering the merits of the appellant's
claim, the majority discounted the relevance of need, compensation and
sharing in the circumstances. 80
More generally, a number of important statements were made by the Supreme
Court; the majority of the court held that the traditional common law rule that
public policy requirements defeat the validity of a prenuptial agreement, on the
basis that such an agreement anticipates a future divorce, is 'obsolete'. 81
Additionally the court did not surrender its discretionary powers grounded in
s 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which accord the court the sole
power to determine the effect that an interspousal agreement is to have. The
court is empowered to uphold such an agreement that has been freely entered
into by the parties, unless the court determines that it would be unfair to do so:
'The court should give effect to a nuptial agreement that is freely entered into by
each party with a full appreciation of its implications unless in the circumstances
prevailing it would not be fair to hold the parties to the agreement.'
More broadly it was emphasised that there 'can be no question of this Court
altering the principle that it is the Court, and not any prior agreement between
the parties, that will determine the appropriate ancillary relief when a marriage
comes to an end, for that principle is embodied in legislation'. 82
Notwithstanding this, the starting point adopted by the Supreme Court is one
79 Ibid at paras 114-116.
s0 Ibid at paras 118-123. For an examination of the impact of the SC decision, and the recent
proposals of the Law Commission see further J Miles 'Marriage and Divorce in the Supreme
Court and the Law Commission: for Love or Money' (2011) 74 MLR 430 444.
s1 Above n 78 at para 52, the Court 'wholeheartedly' endorsed the views of the Board of the
Privy Council in MacLeod v MacLeod [2008] UKPC 64 at para 38 that the old rule that
agreements providing for future separation are contrary to public policy is obsolete and should
be swept away given that there is no longer an enforceable duty upon a husband and wife to
live together, the husband's right to use self-help to keep his wife at home is gone, noting that
such actions would now constitute the offences of kidnapping and false imprisonment.
82 Ibid at para 7.
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of a presumption of enforceability, quite a leap from the pre-existing position
where the discretion of the court trumped any such private arrangement: 8 3
'Thus in future it will be natural to infer that parties who enter into an
ante-nuptial agreement to which English law is likely to be applied intend that
effect should be give to it.'
(b) Law Commission - marital property agreements
The Law Commission project on marital property agreements is ongoing, but
the Consultation Paper published in January 2011 demonstrates the extent of
the work carried out to date by Professor Elizabeth Cooke and her colleagues
at the Law Commission. The 139 page Consultation Paper presents an in-depth
examination of the law on ancillary relief, the consequences of the existing
scope for judicial discretion 84 and the current treatment of marital
agreements.85 The paper is written very much in light of the current
overarching supervisory powers of the judiciary in respect of the enforceability
of marital agreements, as enunciated by the majority of the Supreme Court in
Radmacher v Granatino:86
'Under English law it is the court that is the arbiter of the financial arrangements
between the parties when it brings a marriage to an end. A prior agreement
between the parties is only one of the matters to which the court will have regard.'
Whilst expressly stating that the fact that the law in England and Wales on this
issue is unusual does not in itself justify calls for its reform, the Consultation
Paper reports that 'the vast majority of European countries operate marital
property regimes' that 'all involve the facility for couples to opt for a change of
regime, before or after marriage, by contract'.87 Beyond Europe, the
Consultation Paper sets out the varying approaches currently operating, noting
first the community of property regimes which facilitate private election by
couples,88 and secondly regimes that derive from the common law and more
Ibid at para 70. It was noted that following this judgment a party could no longer claim to have
believed that ante-nuptial agreements were void under English law and therefore likely to carry
little or no weight. It should now be understood that this is no longer the case.
84 Above n 77 part 2; entitled 'The Current Law of Ancillary Relief' explores ancillary relief law
and the consequences of discretion, tracing the exercise of judicial discretion in the case law
that has shaped the governance of ancillary relief issues on divorce.
Ibid, part 3 entitled 'Marital Property Agreements: The Law and its Evolution' examines the
law governing separation, prenuptial and post-nuptial agreements, and in particular the
decision in Radmacher v Granatino, above n 78, and its implications for the law relating to
marital agreements and the law on ancillary relief
86 Above n 78 at para 3, quoted in the Consultation Paper at p 37.
8 Above n 77 at p 61, para 4.6. These European countries are regarded as sharing three features;
they provide for systems of rules for the division of property on death, divorce or bankruptcy,
namely equal division unless otherwise provided by contract between the parties; they are not
typically concerned with maintenance or income provision for spouses and children after
divorce and thirdly they all involve the facility for couples to opt for a change of regime, before
or after marriage, by contract.
Whilst noting that community of property regimes are found throughout the world, the
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typically result in substantial redistribution as determined by the governing
laws and obligations, rather than allowing separate ownership of property to
remain unaffected. Somewhere at the median point, jurisdictions are also
identified where inter parte contractual arrangements can be agreed, but do not
in most instances extend to a capacity to avoid maintenance obligations.89
The project commenced by the Law Commission in October 2009 sought to
consider the extent to which private marital agreements should dictate the
resolution of financial issues on divorce. A range of provisional proposals
together with consultation questions for further development was published in
part 8 of the Consultation Paper. Whilst the 2011 paper asked more questions
than it answered, some very definite positions were adopted by the Law
Commission. It was proposed that agreements made between spouses, before or
after marriage or civil partnership, should no longer be regarded as void or
contrary to public policy, simply by virtue of the fact that an agreement
provides for the financial consequences of a future separation, divorce or
dissolution."o Emphasis was placed on the importance of the principles of
contract law and the need for any qualifying nuptial agreement to be compliant
with such principles including undue influence, disclosure, compliance with
formalities, and the securing of independent legal advice. Additionally the
Commission expressed strong preliminary views on issues of social policy,
including the fundamental requirement that children of the union be
adequately provided for and that no spouse should become dependent upon
state benefits where this could be prevented through an order for the payment
of ancillary relief.91 It was also argued that scope to vary the terms of the
agreement should be retained where enforcing it would produce significant
injustice for one of the parties as well as in other limited circumstances. 92
Following the publication of the Consultation Paper in 2011 and within the
context of this project the Law Commission was additionally charged with
conducting a targeted review of two aspects of the current ancillary relief law,
regarded as causing confusion for separating parties and creating excessive
potential for uncertainty and ultimately inconsistent outcomes. Specifically, the
Law Commission was tasked with examining the extent to which one party
should be required to meet the other party's needs after the relationship has
ended and, secondly, to consider how 'non-matrimonial' property should be
treated on divorce or dissolution. 93 Given the identification of these additional
issues for consideration, the project was renamed Matrimonial Property, Needs
and Agreements and a Supplementary Consultation Paper was published by
Consultation Paper specifically identifies South Africa as a particularly interesting example,
given that it has a system of immediate total community, derived largely from Dutch law, but
notes equally that couples have the option of contracting into community of acquests or into
separation of property; above n 77 at p 64, paras 4.16-4.17.
8 Ibid. These jurisdictions typically derive from the common law of England and Wales and thus
this interspousal duty to maintain remains.
90 Ibid at p 57, para 3.84.
91 Ibid at p 117, para 7.16.
92 Ibid at p 127, para 7.65.
93 For the purpose of this review, non-matrimonial property is defined as property acquired by
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the Law Commission in September 2012. As part of the background to this
extension of the project, it is interesting to note one of the preliminary
observations made by the Commission in its original Consultation Paper; that
whilst the major question being considered is whether the law relating to
marital property agreements ought to be changed to allow such agreements to
oust the jurisdiction of the courts in ancillary relief, if the call for such change
is to assist couples to avoid the uncertainty of the underlying property
distribution regime, then perhaps the focus for reform should in fact be on the
underlying law?94 In essence if changing the law to facilitate reliance upon
enforceable agreements is simply a means of sidestepping the undesirable
regime in place, perhaps it is that regime that is in need of reform, thereby
eliminating the need for such agreements and thus the related need for them to
be regulated. This supplementary paper commences with the legal background
to the extended scope of the project and an explanation of the manner in which
the law needs to be developed, including an exploration as to why such reform
is necessary. Possible approaches to the reform of the law surrounding spousal
needs and related obligations are presented in part 4 of the paper, and limited
legislative amendments being proposed for consideration are set out in part 5.
Part 6 of this supplementary paper proposes that the concept of
non-matrimonial property be defined and raises queries as to how this might
best be approached. Ultimately both consultation papers seek the views of
consultees to contribute to the formulation and publication of the final
recommendations, expected in Autumn 2013.
(c) Conclusion
The Consultation Paper of the Law Commission regards the judgment of the
UKSC in Radmacher v Granatino as a 'restatement of the law' which has taken
the governing law in England and Wales 'as far towards an enforceable status
for marital property agreements as is possible within the current statutory
framework'.95 Clearly one of the key issues for determination now by the Law
Commission is the extent to which statutory intervention remains necessary, in
order to remove or at least minimise the scope of judicial discretion currently
necessitated to determine the extent to which a marital property agreement
should be given effect. Notwithstanding the presumption of enforcement
asserted by the Supreme Court, the extent of the discretion exercisable by the
courts in order to determine the 'fairness' of the agreement is still likely to
require statutory intervention. Certainly in the course of its judgment the
majority of the Supreme Court rejected as not desirable the creation of rules
'that would fetter the flexibility that the court requires to reach a fair result'. 96
Rather what is fair 'will necessarily depend upon the facts of the particular
either party prior to the marriage or civil partnership, or received by gift or inheritance: Law
Commission press release 'Clarifying the law on financial provision for couples when
relationships end' 6 February 2012.
94 Above n 77 at p 82, paras 5.62-5.63.
95 Ibid at p 3, para 1.11.
96 Above n 78 at para 76.
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case'.9 7 By engaging in this wide-scale consultation process, it is anticipated that
the Law Commission will be in a position to trigger the necessary reforms to
address the deficiencies in the current system, ultimately formulating a
considered legal response in England and Wales to the complicated issue of
asset distribution on marital breakdown and the regulation of inter parte
marital agreements.
IV SAME-SEX MARRIAGE - SOME CURRENT
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Marriage equality is an issue of significant social and legal importance, yet
quite differing approaches remain evident in many developed countries.
Although there is a distinct absence of international consensus on the issue,
these are very much changing times and the legal recognition of what might be
regarded as a non-traditional union is slowly becoming more typical of the
regulation of opposite-sex unions. This part will present an insight into the
current legal standing of same-sex marriage, as distinct from civil partnership,
with reference to a number of selected jurisdictions where there have been
recent legal developments.
(a) Europe
Nine European countries recognise same-sex marriage as lawful, namely
Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain
and Sweden.98 Although lawful in Spain since July 2005, the first 8 years of
same-sex marriage in Spain has evidenced much legal challenge in light of
significant political disagreement. Law 13/2005 reformed Spanish law
governing marriage and established that 'a marriage will have the same
requirements and effect whether the contracting parties have the same or
different sex'.99 Consequently the law draws no distinction between
heterosexual and homosexual marriage. Upon its enactment, the constitution-
ality of the law was challenged by the Peoples Party, which was in opposition at
the time of the reform, but subsequently came to power in 2011. The judgment
of the Constitutional Court was delivered in late 2012, with a majority ruling
(8:3), upholding the constitutionality of the provisions.100 The court rejected
97 Ibid.
98 The Netherlands was the first European country to legally recognise same-sex marriage in
2001, followed by Belgium (2003), Spain (2005), Norway (2009), Sweden (2009), Iceland
(2010), Portugal (2010) and Denmark (2012). An additional 14 have a legally recognised form
of civil union or unregistered cohabitation.
99 Amending and adding a second paragraph to s 44 of the Spanish Civil Code. See M
Ahumada-Ruiz 'Spain: Constitutional Tribunal rejects challenge to same-sex marriage - law
13/2005 that modified the Civil Code, constitutional' [2013] Public Law 428.
100 Judgment 198/2012, unreported 6 November 2012 (Trib Const (Sp)). The matter came before
the Constitutional Court when 71 deputies in the Lower House signed the brief challenging the
constitutionality of the Law and the Constitutional court admitted the application. See further
Ahumada-Ruiz, n 99 at 428-429.
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the argument that the provisions conflicted with the constitutional limitations
of the right to marry being that of heterosexual couples, confirming that, whilst
marriage as an institution is to be protected, its scope is subject to evolution in
light of public perceptions and social norms, as noted by Ahumada-Ruiz: 'the
marriage protected by the Constitution is the one recognised and identified as
such by the law and the society at a given time, not a static or immutable form
fixed at the time of adopting the Constitution'.10 1 Despite the strong Catholic
tradition in Spain and the vehement opposition voiced by the Church, the
Spanish regulatory provisions do not expressly include an opt-out clause for
religious bodies, which appears an important aspect of the current debates in
the United Kingdom, discussed below. Rather, the Spanish law, regarded as
particularly liberal, merely provides that pre-2005 laws relating to marriage now
apply equally, and have the same requirements and effect when the two people
entering into the contract are of the same sex or of different sexes.
A number of European jurisdictions are in a state of legal change at present;
England and Wales and Scotland are at the cusp of fundamental law reform on
the issue of same-sex marriage, with draft laws before each of their respective
Parliaments. In England and Wales marriage has always been defined as the
permanent union of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others.102
Reflecting this long-standing position, s 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes
Act 1973 declares that a marriage is void if the parties are not respectively male
and female. Since 2005 by virtue of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 same-sex
couples can validly enter into a civil partnership which although providing the
legal consequences of marriage is not classified as marriage. The legality of this
distinction between opposite-sex and same-sex couples was challenged in the
English High Court in Wilkinson v Kitzinger.103 The parties, a lesbian couple,
had married in Canada in 2003, where same-sex marriages are permitted.
Although their union attained the status of civil partnership under English law
following the enactment of the Civil Partnership Act 2004, they sought
recognition of their union as a marriage, under English law. They argued that,
given that their marriage was legal in the country in which it was solemnised
and met the requirements for recognition of overseas marriages, it should thus
be treated in the same way under English law as one between opposite-sex
couples. The High Court ruled against them, refusing to grant their union
marital status. The President of the Family Division, Sir Mark Potter, whilst
accepting the fact of the discriminatory treatment of their union in classifying
it as a civil partnership but not marriage, regarded this distinction as justified
given that 'such discrimination has a legitimate aim, is reasonable and
proportionate, and falls within the margin of appreciation accorded to
Convention States'. 104 Additionally, in light of the protections afforded to the
couple by the 2004 Act he stated that 'abiding single sex relationships are in no
way inferior, nor does English Law suggests that they are by according them
recognition under the name of civil partnership' but are, as a matter of nature
101 Above n 99 at 429.
102 Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee (1866) LR 1 PD 130.
103 Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam) (31 July 2006).
10 Ibid at para 122.
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and common understanding different.105 In support of this difference, he
approved of the statement of Lord Nicholls in Bellinger v Bellinger10 6 regarding
the distinct traditional categorisation of marriage: 'Marriage is an institution
or a relationship deeply embedded in the religious and social culture of this
country. It is deeply embedded as a relationship between two persons of the
opposite sex.'107
However, given the ever-evolving nature of the law and shifting social
perceptions in this area, this decision is one that is likely to be revisited. Whilst
another case is awaited to challenge this position, it may be overtaken by
change in the legislative context. Following a consultation process,108 in
January 2013 the UK Conservative Government introduced the Marriage
(Same Sex Couples) Bill to permit and regulate same-sex marriage. Section 1(1)
of the Bill provides, very simply, that marriage of same-sex couples is lawful. 109
The aims of the Bill are (inter alia) to make provision for the marriage of
same-sex couples in England and Wales and to address the issue of gender
change by married persons and civil partners.110 Additionally it would enable
religious organisations to opt-in to conduct same-sex marriages if they wished
to do so, thereby deliberately protecting religious organisations and individuals
from being forced to conduct same-sex marriages. Reflecting the controversial
nature of the measures being introduced, religious protection forms a very
prominent aspect of the Bill, including provision to ensure that there can be no
compulsion upon religious orders or members of a religious order to solemnise
a marriage between a same-sex couple.1 1 Finally, of note, the Bill also enables
civil partners to convert their civil partnership to a marriage and married
1o' Ibid at para 113; see further J Herring Family Law (Longman Law Series, 5th edn, 2011) at 79.
106 Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] 2 AC 467.
107 Ibid at para 46.
'os In March 2012 the Government launched a consultation 'Equal Civil Marriage: A
Consultation' which looked at how to enable same-sex couples to get married. The
consultation ran for 13 weeks, closing on 14 June 2012. Just over 228,000 responses were
submitted, together with 19 petitions, the largest response ever received to a Government
consultation. See www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment-data/file/
133258/consultation-document_1_.pdf (accessed June 2013).
109 Section 1(2) provides that '[t]he marriage of a same sex couple may only be solemnized in
accordance with
(a) Part 3 of the Marriage Act 1949,
(b) Part 5 of the Marriage Act 1949,
(c) the Marriage (Registrar General's Licence) Act 1970, or
(d) an Order in Council made under Part 1 or 3 of Schedule 6'.
110 Available at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2013-2014/0034/14034.pdf (accessed
June 2013).
.. Section 2 (1): 'A person may not be compelled to-
(a) undertake an opt-in activity, or
(b) refrain from undertaking an opt-out activity'.
Section 2(2) 'A person may not be compelled
(a) to conduct a relevant marriage,
(b) to be present at, carry out, or otherwise participate in, a relevant marriage, or
(c) to consent to a relevant marriage being conducted,
where the reason for the person not doing that thing is that the relevant marriage concerns a
same sex couple.'
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transgender people to gain legal recognition in their acquired gender without
having to end their marriage. Section 9 provides that the parties to a civil
partnership previously conducted in England and Wales may convert their civil
partnership into a marriage under a procedure established by regulations made
by the Registrar General. Further where a civil partnership is converted into a
marriage, the civil partnership ends on the conversion, and the resulting
marriage is to be treated as having subsisted since the date the civil partnership
was formed. Any attempts to retain a distinction is defeated by s 11 which
provides that: 'In the law of England and Wales, marriage has the same effect in
relation to same sex couples as it has in relation to opposite sex couples.'1 12
In February 2013, the Bill was passed by the members of the House of
Commons, 400 votes to 175 following the second reading, and then considered
by the Public Bill Committee. The committee considered many amendments
and several new clauses, but ultimately none of these was agreed to and the Bill
was reported to the House of Commons on 12 March 2013 without
amendment. 113 The Bill is due to have its report stage and third reading on a
date to be announced. The controversial nature of the Bill is reflected in the
views expressed by the four dissenting members of the Public Bill Committee
who voted against the Bill at second reading and provided the main opposition
to the Bill at committee stage, as is evident in the committee stage report. The
amendments tabled (but all ultimately withdrawn) related, inter alia, to a
proposed definition of the purpose of marriage, 114 a confirmation of the
capacity of the Church of England to make provision about marriage,115 a
statement that premises owned by listed bodies could not be licensed for
same-sex marriage1 6 and a provision regarding the protection of teachers who
expressed dissenting views regarding same-sex marriage.117 In this context, the
committee stage report noted the 'highly controversial' nature of the proposals
in the Bill and the 'strong opinions' expressed by interested parties, both for
and against same-sex marriage.118
Similar legislative developments have begun in Scotland; the Scottish
government published its Consultation Paper in 2011, The Registration of Civil
Partnerships Same Sex Marriage, A Consultation which had proposed the
opening of marriage to same-sex couples, whilst equally providing protection
for religious bodies with objections to such developments. Of note, however, is
that the Consultation Paper provided that religious groups willing to become
involved in the creation of civil partnerships through civil and religious
112 Section 11(1).
113 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill Committee stage report. Bill no 126 of 2012-2013 Research
Paper 13/22 14 March 2013 at 2, para 5. Available at www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/
RP13-22 (accessed June 2013).
114 Ibid at para 6.2.
11 Ibid at para 6.3.
116 Ibid at para 6.6.
117Ibid at para 6.10.
18 Ibid at 1. At the Public Bill Committee Stage four dissenters voted against the Bill, named in
the Report as David Burrowes, Tim Loughton, Jim Shannon and Kwasi Kwarteng.
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ceremonies should be permitted to do so. 1 19 As regards marriage however,
Norrie notes that, if the right to marry is to apply equally to all couples,
difficulties might arise should discriminatory approaches be applied by
religious bodies.120 As in England and Wales, these legislative proposals take
place in the context of the relatively recent regulation of civil partnerships,
introduced by the Civil Partnership Act 2004. The draft Marriage and Civil
Partnership Bill was published in December 2012 and the Scottish
Government's consultation on its contents ran until 20 March 2013.
Interestingly the draft Bill has cross-party support, reflecting a general mood
for change, but is opposed by the Church of Scotland and the Roman Catholic
Church. It will be put before the Scottish Parliament upon completion of the
consultation process. It is envisaged that the enactment of the right to same-sex
marriage will be provided for by way of amendment to the existing Marriage
(Scotland) Act 1977, incorporating an amendment of the s 2(1A) definitions of
spouses to include the parties to a marriage between persons of the same sex.
Additionally, s 5(4)(e) of the 1977 Act will be repealed, and s 5(4)(f) modified
as necessary in light of the repeal of s 5(4).121
France has become the ninth European member state to legalise same-sex
marriage having very recently passed Bill 344122 to extend the right to marry
and adopt to same-sex couples. Although the National Assembly voted against
the legalisation of same-sex marriage in 2011, it became a key election issue in
2012 with the now President Frangois Hollande making an electoral pledge to
extend the right to marry and adopt to same-sex couples. Draft legislation to
permit same-sex marriage was introduced by the Cabinet in November 2012
and completed its passage in the National Assembly on 12 February 2013.123
Bill 344 was approved by the National Assembly on 12 February 2013 in a
329:229 vote. It passed through committee stage and was adopted by the
French National Assembly on 23 April 2013 in a 331:225 final vote. Of note,
these political and legal developments have taken place against a background
of diverse public opinion and vocal opposition, with repeated public protests
involving tens of thousands of French citizens who oppose the equalisation of
the right to marry. This is reflected in the challenge to the law by the opposition
UMP Party filed with the Constitutional Council, which has one month to rule.
Finally, 14 European states, including those set out above, currently legally
recognise civil partnerships or unregistered cohabiting arrangements between
same-sex couples but do not extend their laws to an equal right to marriage.124
119 Under the relevant governing legislative provisions, opposite-sex couples can choose religious
or civil solemnisation whereas same-sex couples are limited to civil registration. See further K
Norrie 'Religion and same-sex unions: the Scottish Government's consultation on registration
of civil partnerships and same-sex marriage' [2012] Edin LR 95 at 96.
120 Ibid at 97.
121 Section 5(4)(e) currently provides that there is a legal impediment to a marriage where both
parties are of the same sex.
122 Projet de loi ouvrant le mariage aux couples de personnes de mime sexe, no 344. See also the
chapter on France in this Survey.
123 Available at www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/ta/ta0084.asp (accessed June 2013).
124 France (1999), Germany (2001), Finland (2002), Croatia (2003), Luxembourg (2004), Andorra
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However, opinion polls across Europe indicate a ground swell in favour of the
extension of the right to marry to same-sex couples and it is expected that in
time, further legislative and judicial developments will see the gradual growth in
the number of states that legislate to equalise the right to marry. Ireland is
currently in the throes of political and social debate concerning the possible
recognition of an equal right to marriage; the Irish Constitutional Convention,
established to review the written Constitution of Ireland, 125 debated the issue of
same-sex marriage in April 2013 and overwhelmingly voted in favour of putting
the matter before the Irish people by way of referendum. 126 Of note is that the
Convention has received 50 times the average number of submissions received
in respect of all other issues debated to date. 127
(b) United States of America
In the United States of America, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),
enacted in 1996,128 is a federal law which limits the definition of marriage to a
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and
provides that the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite-sex who
is a husband or a wife.129 This limited definition of marriage in turn prevents
parties other than married heterosexual couples from accessing all federal
benefits, including insurance benefits for government employees, social security
survivors' benefits, immigration, and the right to file joint tax returns or receive
spousal tax exemptions and benefits. More broadly the federal government is
prevented from recognising any marriage between same-sex couples, even where
those couples are considered to be validly married in their own state.
The political view of DOMA has dramatically altered since its enactment in
1996, and this is reflected in changes introduced by an increasing number of
states in respect of the legality of same-sex marriages. At present, 10 individual
states and the District of Columbia have legalised same-sex marriages 30 but 38
states still expressly prohibit same-sex marriage either through legislative or
constitutional provisions. President Obama has long endorsed the repeal of
(2005), United Kingdom (2005), Czech Republic (2006), Slovenia (2006), Switzerland (2007),
Hungary (2009), Austria (2010), Ireland (2011) and Liechtenstein (2011).
125 See further www.constitution.ie/ (accessed June 2013). The Convention is tasked with
considering certain aspects of the Constitution and to make recommendations to the Irish
Parliament on future amendments to be put to the people in referenda. The Convention
comprises 100 people; 66 randomly selected citizens; 33 parliamentarians and an independent
Chairman.
126 See www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/constitutional-convention-backs-extension-of-
marriage-rights-to-same-sex-couples-1.1359910 (accessed June 2013).
127 1029 submissions were received by the Constitutional Convention on this issue.
128 1 USC § 7 and 28 USC § 1738C.
129 DOMA, s 3.
130 The States of Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia allow marriages
between persons of the same sex.
33
The International Survey of Family Law
DOMA and in 2011, Attorney-General Eric Holder, on behalf of the President
announced a radical shift in approach to the defence of DOMA:131
'After careful consideration, including a review of my recommendation, the
President has concluded that given a number of factors, including a documented
history of discrimination, classifications based on sexual orientation should be
subject to a more heightened standard of scrutiny. The President has also
concluded that Section 3 of DOMA, as applied to legally married same-sex
couples, fails to meet that standard and is therefore unconstitutional. Given that
conclusion, the President has instructed the Department not to defend the statute
in such cases.'
In addition to this stance being adopted by the President, legislative and
judicial developments in relation to same-sex marriage have also occurred.
First, from a legislative viewpoint, a draft Bill, the Respect of Marriage Act,132
to repeal DOMA has been presented to both Congress and the Senate and is
supported by President Obama. 133 Secondly, numerous judgments have been
delivered by federal courts, pronouncing the definition under s 3 of DOMA to
be unconstitutional and the opportunity has now been presented to the US
Supreme Court to take a definitive stand on the issue.
In March and April 2013 arguments were made in two such high profile cases
before the US Supreme Court: Windsor v United States and Hollingsworth v
Perry. The impact of the limited definition of marriage upon the tax liabilities
of a surviving same-sex spouse was demonstrated in Windsor v United States,
and formed the basis for a challenge to the constitutionality of s 3 of DOMA.
Windsor had succeeded in her action before the New York Circuit and
presiding Judge Barbara Jones ordered a tax refund to be made to Ms Windsor.
The decision was confirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in late
2012 and oral arguments were presented to the US Supreme Court in March
2013, with judgment expected in June 2013. Whilst it is difficult to predict the
outcome, the growing public support to end discrimination and permit
same-sex marriage suggests that the Supreme Court might very well strike
down the federal law on the basis of unconstitutionality but may stop at
imposing any new standard on individual states. It is more likely that a stance
will be taken in respect of the constitutionality of s 3 but states will be
permitted to develop their laws in line with their individual social policies. 134
The second case currently being considered by the Supreme Court relates to
California's Proposition 8, which bans same-sex marriage. Although California
131 See www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-222.html (accessed June 2013). The state-
ment followed two lawsuits, Pedersen v OPM 10 CV 1750 and Windsor v United States 833 F
Supp 2d 394 (SDNY 2012), affirmed in 699 F 3d 169 (2d Cir 2012), where s 3 of DOMA had
been challenged. As a result of this new stance the Attorney-General confirmed that the
Department would not defend the constitutionality of s 3 as applied to same-sex married
couples in these two cases before the Second Circuit.
132 Bill HR - 1116.
133 There are now 159 co-sponsors of the Bill (April 2013).
134 Section 3 of DOMA has been found unconstitutional in eight federal courts, including the
First and Second Circuit Court of Appeals, on issues including bankruptcy, public employee
benefits, estate taxes, and immigration.
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sanctioned same-sex marriages in 2008, it subsequently imposed Proposition 8,
a ban on the performance of same-sex marriages in California, although it does
continue to recognise the legality of same-sex marriages performed in other
jurisdictions. In March 2013 in Hollingsworth v Perry the Supreme Court was
asked to consider whether the guarantee of equal protection for all citizens
under the law, as provided for in the 14th Amendment to the Constitution
ought, to prevent states from defining marriage in a limited manner. The US
Supreme Court is being challenged to rule upon a key social and familial issue
in the context of two high profile cases; time will tell if they lead to a radical
change to the legal landscape. 135
(c) Recent developments at the European Court of Human
Rights
The capacity for parties to a same-sex partnership to secure protection under
Art 8 of the ECHR, guarantee of respect for private and family life, was
recently considered by the First Section Chamber of the ECtHR. Additionally
the Chamber considered the extent, if at all, to which the guarantees under
Art 12 (right to marry) and Art 14 (right to non-discrimination) can be relied
upon by parties to same-sex relationships where they seek to vindicate their
rights to equal treatment. First, in the context of a claim to assert the right to
marry, the ECtHR accepted in Schalk and Kopf v Austria 36 that same-sex
partnerships may come within the 'protection of family life' element of Art 8,
an extension of the previously limited application of the right to protection of
the parties' 'private life' under Art 8. However, this judgment is equally
significant given the willingness of the ECtHR to allow individual states a
significant 'margin of appreciation' in respect of the equalisation of the right to
marry, thereby limiting the impact of the extension of the application of Art 8.
Interestingly, in Schalk and Kopf v Austria whilst it was the identified consensus
on the right to legal recognition of same-sex partnerships which led the
Chamber to recognise the right to respect for both private and family life for
parties to a same-sex relationship, it was the lack of consensus amongst
signatory states on the extension of the right to marry to same-sex couples that
resulted in a reliance upon the 'margin of appreciation' of individual states
rather than identify any actionable breach of the rights recognised by the
ECHR under Art 12.
The challenge before the First Section Chamber of the ECtHR in Schalk and
Kopf v Austria was made by a male same-sex couple in respect of the limitation
of the right to marry to two persons of the opposite sex under art 44 of the
13' For detailed commentary see WN Eskridge Jr 'The California Proposition 8 Case: What Is a
Constitution For?' (2010) 98 Cal L Rev 1235; JA Garver 'The Ninth Circuit's Perry Decision
and the Constitutional Politics of Marriage Equality' (2012) 64 Stan L Rev Online 93.
136 Schalk and Kopf v Austria [2010] ECHR 995. For an excellent commentary on the significance
of this case and the subsequent case of PB and JS v Austria [2010] ECHR 1146 see N
Bamforth 'Families but not (yet) marriages? Same-sex partners and the developing European
Convention "margin of appreciation"' [2011] 23 CFLQ 128-143.
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Austrian Civil code.13 7 As per cases in other jurisdictions, including Wilkinson v
Kitzinger in England and Wales, since the commencement of their domestic
action challenging this exclusion from the right to marry, Austrian law had
enacted the Registered Partnership Act which since 2010 permits same-sex
couples to register as partners. Notwithstanding this domestic development,
the applicants argued that Austrian law remained in breach of their Art 14
right to non-discriminatory treatment, the discrimination not being objectively
justifiable in the circumstances. They claimed that the limited definition of
marriage under Austrian law was a breach of their Art 12 right to marry,
arguing inter alia that, as the Convention must be regarded as a living
document, their right to marry should be interpreted to reflect the current
international acceptance of the right of same-sex couples to have their
relationships recognised by law. Whilst the Chamber did not deny the capacity
of the ECHR to evolve so that its provisions reflect modern norms, in this
context it did not accept the fact of a cross-jurisdictional consensus on the issue
of same-sex marriage, noting that 'at present no more than six out of 47
Convention states allow same-sex marriage'. 138 Thus any argument that the
interpretation of the Convention provisions reflect modern consensus was
swiftly defeated by the lack of that very consensus amongst signatory states in
respect of a right to same-sex marriage. In further defence of the position
adopted, the Chamber of the ECtHR, in exploring the nature of the right to
marry both under the ECHR and EU human rights laws, relied upon Art 9 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union which expressly
refers to the determination of the scope of the right by individual national
states:139
'The right to marry and the right to found a family shall be guaranteed in
accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these rights.'
This delegation of the determination of the nature and extent of the right to
marry to individual signatory states and the corresponding lack of compulsion
upon those states to provide an absolute right to marry was regarded as
preventing the Chamber from rushing 'to substitute its own judgment in place
of that of the national authorities, who are best placed to assess and respond to
the needs of society'. 140 This combination of the lack of a consensus amongst
signatory states on the issue of same-sex marriage and the express deference to
the national laws governing the exercise of the right to marry and found a
family in the Charter of Fundamental Rights thus permitted the Chamber to
rely upon the 'margin of appreciation' exercisable by individual states.141
13 Article 44 of the Civil Code (Allgemeines Birgerliches Gesetzbuch) provides: 'The marriage
contract shall form the basis for family relationships. Under the marriage contract two persons
of opposite sex declare their lawful intention to live together in indissoluble matrimony, to
beget and raise children and to support each other.'
13' Above n 136 at para 57.
139 See www.europarl.europa.eulcharter/pdf/text-en.pdf (accessed June 2013).
140 Above n 136 at para 62.
141 For a critical examination of the 'margin of appreciation' doctrine see further F Hamilton
'Why the margin of appreciation is not the answer to the gay marriage debate' [2013] EHRLR
47-55.
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However, Hamilton is critical of this approach, suggesting reliance upon the
margin of appreciation leads to a lack of certainty, giving rise to confusion and
a distinct lack of clarity in such a crucial aspect of human rights protection.
Additionally she notes the unwelcome capacity for ECHR contracting states
'to introduce their own legislation . . . and decide on judicial supervision of
such legislation, without the reasons behind their decisions having to be
examined by the Court'. 142
In Schalk and Kopf v Austria the acceptance by the Chamber of a shift in
societal attitude to a recognition of same-sex partnerships, albeit not marriages,
formed the basis of its willingness to apply the respect of private and family life
under Art 8 to the claimants' circumstances. However, this development is
limited in its impact. Whilst the Chamber willingly recognised the right of
same-sex couples to respect for their private and family life, that recognition did
not translate into a right to marry, as exists for opposite-sex couples. The
Chamber relied upon the margin of appreciation in assessing what
discriminatory treatment is proportionate and justifiable, concluding that
Art 12 does not impose a positive obligation upon the governments of
signatory states to provide a right to marry to all citizens and further that
Art 14 could not be invoked to create such a right on the basis of
non-discrimination notwithstanding its acceptance of the application of both
aspects of Art 8 protection to same-sex couples. Thus it is evident that the
notion of equal rights for same-sex couples is very much dependent upon the
eventual (if at all) development of a consensus between signatory states, which
notwithstanding the evolving nature of the rights of same-sex couples, will
remain unaffected by the rulings of the ECtHR for some time to come. As with
the current developments in the United States of America, it is likely that this
issue of social and political importance will remain within the remit of
domestic/state law-makers for the foreseeable future.
142 Ibid at 50.
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